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This article conceptualizes gender equity and sexual liberty issues that most of the literature on democracy and democratization
in Turkey fails to address. The major focus of the article is on the convergent and divergent positions of the rising democratization
discourse in contemporary Turkey. When the democratization discourses of different political groups are analyzed, we see that the
convergent points consist of legal and constitutional changes that aim at political and economic liberalization, while the divergent
points include liberalization in the private sphere and engaging in gender equity and sexual liberty issues. Therefore, we argue that
it is crucial to analyze gender equity and sexual liberty issues with more dynamic concepts such as globalization and the EU
accession process of Turkey rather than the essentialist ones like Islam.
© 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.“Generalizations that lead to essentialist conclusions
necessarily hide the diversity which exists in both
the east and the west.” (Elsadda, 2004, p.45)
Introduction
In order to become a candidate country to join the
European Union (EU), since 1999, the governments in
Turkey have been obliged to further liberalize and
democratize the political regime in conformity with the
EU acquis (Heper, 2005, p.37). Özbudun (2000) states
that the main problems of democratic consolidation in
Turkey are firstly the de-institutionalization of the
political party system as a consequence of growing☆ This research has been partially supported by a generous grant
from TUBITAK (The Scientific and Technological Research Council
of Turkey).
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doi:10.1016/j.wsif.2007.09.002electoral volatility, fragmentation and polarization;
secondly constitutional problems such as lack of popular
debate on tutelary powers and reserved domains granted
to military, problems concerning fundamental rights and
liberties; and thirdly the challenges which stem from
political Islam and Kurdish nationalism. Since the
preconditions that must be fulfilled for the EU
membership require overcoming the problems especially
in the second and the third categories, the EU process and
deepening democracy in Turkey are considered to be the
two interconnected phenomenon. Indeed, the Helsinki
Summit (December 1999), which ascribed Turkey with
candidacy status, asked Turkey to comply with mem-
bership requirements as set by the Copenhagen Europe-
an Council (June 1993), which include ensuring the
stability of institutions, guaranteeing complete freedom
of expression, human rights, respect and protection for
minorities and an efficient market economy (Cizre,
2003, p.223). Not only the governments have displayed
strong political will to restructure the Turkish legal
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criteria, but other actors such as the opposition parties
(representing Kurdish agenda and political Islam), civil
society organizations (women's organizations, gay and
lesbian organizations, human rights associations and the
Alawite1), business and workers' organizations (right
wing and left wing) and the media, have increasingly
adopted a political discourse that supports the political
and economic reforms.
This article is the result of a research project on the
rising discourse on democracy in Turkey, and has been
sponsored by a generous grant from TUBITAK
(Scientific and Technological Research Council of
Turkey) in 2005 and 2006. The goal of this research
project is an in-depth analysis of the debate on
democracy during the EU accession process of Turkey
by identifying the bottlenecks and common denomina-
tors among the political actors in action research format.
We claim that the absence of gender and sexuality issues
in the democracy discourse in Turkey at the beginning of
the 21st century is the principle element of how the
political elite imagine democracy and this fact is the most
critical bottleneck of democracy in Turkey. Although
gender is an important component of the democracy
discourse; most of the literature on democracy and
democratization in Turkey fails to evaluate gender
issues, which this article aims to complement.
The relationship between gender and politics has been
studied from many angles such as women's political
participation, labor force participation, the movement for
‘head cover’ (hijab), and domestic violence, etc. Yet the
way the democratization literature covers gender equity
and sexual liberty issues has not been studied in depth.
Gender politics needs to be understood in its own
context. Moghadam provides an analytical framework
by emphasizing the relationship between the rise of
identity politics and the conservative values on gender
and sexuality in the non-western world in general, and in
Islamic societies in particular (Moghadam, 1994). To
understand gender politics in the context of Turkey, we
must date back its problem to the establishment of the
Turkish Republic in 1923 under the leadership of Kemal
Atatürk, and to the political and institutional reforms that
gave women the right to participate in municipal (1930)
and national elections in 1934 (Tekeli, 1998, p.341).
These political rights to elect and to be elected made
women politically equal tomen, yet the traditional role of
women has always been glorified, and women continued
to be defined as the corner stones of the society, and they
represented the purity of the newly born Turkish nation.
As the mothers of the nation, they not only give birth to
babies but also to the future of a nation. As Durakbaşaargues ‘Kemalism (…) did not alter the patriarchal norms
of morality, and in fact maintained the basic cultural
conservatism about male/female relations, despite its
radicalism in opening a space for women in the public
domain’ (Durakbaşa, 1998, p.140). This paradox of
Turkish nationalism gave rise to the current bottlenecks
of Turkish democratization, but to be able to deal with
them, one needs to understand the dynamics and
motivations of the rising democracy discourse in Turkey.
Turkey's accession process to the EU has enjoyed a
high rate of support from different segments of the
Turkish society in the past decade. This support was the
result of the hopes, motivations and expectations that
different segments of the society had from the EU. The
hopes and expectations of the economically disadvan-
taged groups were that their living standards would be
improved; the unemployed hoped that there would be
more job opportunities than the present; the workers
believed that their conditions of work would be
improved; the underrepresented groups (e.g. women,
Kurds, Islamists, religious minorities, gays) dreamed of
the social and political liberties that would come along
with the EU accession process; the business circles
desired a stable political and economic life that was
crucial for their businesses to prosper; and the state elites
of the Kemalists considered the EU accession as a
natural component of their ultimate goal, namely
catching up with contemporary civilization and moder-
nization of the West. As a response to all these hopes
and expectations, the political elites, from right to left
wing, emphasized ensuring full accession to the EU as
their first and foremost goal in their policy agendas. Not
surprisingly, these high rates of support for the EU
accession in the population went along with a rising
democracy discourse since ‘deepening democracy’ is
the major requirement for joining the EU as outlined by
the Copenhagen Criteria.
The present article, will address the bottlenecks of the
rising democracy discourse in Turkey in the context
discussed above, and its relationship with the gender
equity agenda. The questions are: What have been the
parameters of the positive attitude in Turkey toward
Turkey's accession to EU, particularly with relation to
democratization? When they talk about democratiza-
tion, what are different groups actually asking for?
Which values, if any, associated with democracy, are
favored over the others? Do different groups promote
different kinds of democratic values?
Our research questions were formed around these
concerns with reference to the convergent and divergent
points that each political elite group claimed on the
matter of democratization and EU process. Considering
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adopting the Copenhagen criteria, we expected to find
that all political and social groups in Turkey would
support the legal and constitutional changes that aimed
at political and economic liberalization. However,
considering also the political culture approach that is
to be detailed in the Literature review of this article, we
hypothesized that the point of resistance to deepening
democratization in Turkey would consist of the issues
that were related to the general cultural values of the
Turkish society. In the democracy discourse of the
different segments of the society, the convergent points
would consist of legal and constitutional changes that
aimed at political and economic liberalization, while
divergent points would include the issues related to
liberalization in the private sphere engaging gender and
sexual liberty issues. In other words there would not be
agreed definitions of democracy and democratic values
in Turkey, and therefore, the democratic values would
be variable from one political elite group to another; and
the discourse on democracy and democratic values
would vary with time, space, and conjuncture.
Literature review
Exploration and comprehension of the democratic
values among the political elite of contemporary Turkish
politics is at the heart of this research. Culture has been
perceived a very critical component of any democracy
since Max Weber2: the patterns of culture have been
associated with the emergence and stability of democ-
racy. In the modernization theory, the economic
development and cultural development are two parallel
phenomena, a mix of which, in turn, brings about
democracy. There are many scholars who argue that the
stability of a democracy needs a particular political
culture that includes a commitment to democratic values
or rules at least among the political elites, on participa-
tion, toleration, consensus, and the like (e.g. Dahl,
Diamond, Eckstein, O'Donnell). However, there are also
others who argue that democratization is the conse-
quence of a particular political culture that is thought to
be an outcome of a certain religion, economic develop-
ment, industrialization, or social conflicts and wars.
Prominent authors of the political culture approach,
Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba argue in Civic
Culture: Political Attitudes & Democracy in Five
Nations (1963) that the prevalence of certain values
and beliefs over others is necessary for the emergence of
a stable and effective democracy. They identify three
different political cultures: parochial, subject, and
participant, prioritizing ‘civic culture’ as the most idealpolitical culture for democracy. The ideal civic culture of
democracy requires not only participant but also other
traditional or parochial attitudes. In other words, the
citizen of democracy is expected be ‘active, yet passive;
involved, yet not too involved; influential, yet differen-
tial’ (Almond & Verba, 1963, p.479). Another well-
known study on the relationship between political
culture, values and democracy is Robert D. Putnam's
Making Democracy Work (1993) where he compares
the Northern and Southern Italy in terms of socio-
economic modernization, civic involvement, and dem-
ocratic performance. His findings suggest that, rather
than the economic development, it is the distinct history/
culture of civic involvement, which consists of active
participation in public affairs, the development of ideas
of political equality, solidarity, trust, tolerance, and the
formation of voluntary association that accounts for
democratic performance. Perhaps, the most well-known
hypothesis that establishes a direct relationship between
democratization and culture is Huntington's ‘Clash of
Civilizations’ (1993). He argues that culture, which he
uses interchangeably with religion, explains why in
some parts of the world especially in the Muslim world
democracy is missing. He argues that the political values
that gave birth to democracy in western civilizations
lacks in Middle Eastern societies, which are dominated
by Islam. These values are (1) separation of religious and
secular authority, (2) rule of law, (3) social pluralism, (4)
parliamentary institutions of representative government,
and finally (5) protection of individual rights and civil
liberties as being the buffer between citizens and the
power of the state. Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart
(2002) tested Huntington's thesis empirically with
comparative research on the beliefs and values of Islamic
and non-Islamic societies in seventy-five countries and
confirmed it partially. According to this research, culture
does matter, and religions do have important effects on
contemporary social and political values. However, there
are striking similarities in the political values held in
different societies. According to Norris and Inglehart
(2002), the real cultural gulf separating Islamic societies
from their Western counterparts involves the values
concerning gender equity and sexual liberalization far
more than political democratic values such as participa-
tion, accountability, and the like. Norris and Inglehart,
however, are more optimistic than Huntington and argue
that economic development and modernization will
cause changes in these values in the Muslim world in
time.
One recent research project on conservatism in
contemporary Turkey, namely ‘Conservatism, Family,
Religion and the West in Turkey’ (Yilmaz, unpublished
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Turkey is the family rather than the state. While
previously state-centered politics were thought to be
the major source of social and political conservatism in
Turkey, Yilmaz's study refocuses the attention to the
private sphere. It is surprising that alongside the increase
in the process of democratization that accompanies the
EU accession process, the level of conservatism among
Turkish people is rising significantly. Another study,
‘Sexual Regime Axis: Warm Family Environment’, puts
emphasis on the conservative values in the family (Bora
& Üstun, 2005). In this study, the norms and patterns
about gender relationships are explored. The authors
analyze how women perceive and interpret the repres-
sion and violence that they experience as they build/
form themselves as subjects in this restricted environ-
ment, and argue that such norms and patterns are
conservative and anti-democratic in nature.
While the democratization literature is addressing its
own failure in dealing with the complexities of
democracy by bringing cultural arguments into the
analysis, the blind spot of this literature is the absence of
gender issues. This leads most students of ‘democrati-
zation’ to claim that some societies lack democratic
values as a consequence of their cultures. Hence, the lack
or shortcomings of democracy is put into to the equation
‘culture = Islam’. We argue that the main bottlenecks of
democracy are related to the lack of the notion of gender
equity and not to the religious orientation and that it is
that lack which counts for conservatism in any society.
We agree with the work done by Elsadda (2004) which
challenges the culturalist/essentialist perspective and
highlights the simplicity of the ‘sexual clash of
civilization theory’. The author stresses that the
approaches which explain gender issues with respect to
culture/religion, oversimplify the diversity that exists in
the Eastern and Western societies. She argues that issues
such as abortion or low rate of women's participation
into politics are not particular to Islamic societies. In
parallel with this argument, the present article will
elaborate this gender blind spot in the case of Turkey.
Historically speaking, Turkey as a secular, democratic
country with a huge Muslim population, offers a fertile
ground to examine gender and democracy issues.
Interestingly, after the establishment of the Republic,
when women attempted to establish the first political
party (Women's Public Party, 1923), this project was not
permitted by the political elites (Tekeli, 1998, p.341).
Instead of a political party, Nezihe Muhittin and her
friends did manage to establish the Turkish Women's
Association and they had significant impact on the rising
awareness about gender equity in Turkey, until theirclosure in 1935 (Kırkpınar, 2001, p.197). Although this
Association had great impact on the progress of the role of
women in the society in general and in politics in
particular, they could not break the traditional vein. It was
clear that the internalized traditional role of womanhood
could not be erased easily. Rights given to increase the
social and legal status of women defined women within
certain boundaries. The women internalized the Kemalist
nationalist ideology and the steps taken towards the
emancipation of Turkish women created the ‘modern but
modest’ women of the Republic (Kadıoğlu, 1996).
Kandiyoti (1987) stresses that theKemalistmodernization
project created ‘emancipated but not liberated’women by
desexualizing her body in the public.
During the multi party politics, after 1950, women's
associations and organizations were oriented towards
philanthropic goals, and they did not have much political
objective (Çakır, 1996, p.751). In the 1970s, however,
women's associations were established by women on the
left, addressing general political issues with little or no
reference to gender equity (Çakır, 1996). The military
intervention of September 12, 1980 affected the whole of
the political life of Turkey, including the closure of the
political parties, groups, associations etc. Oddly enough,
feminist activism corresponds to this period, although the
level of representation of women in politics did not
increase much (Eşim & Cindoğlu, 1999). In other words,
the mainstreaming of feminist activism did not occur in
Turkey in the last two decades, therefore the percentage of
local or national women representatives in the political
arena did not increase and women's issues were not
brought to the daily political agendas (Arat, 1998).
Modern democratic theory and classical debates
question the inclusiveness of democratic systems
(Phillips, 1991). Classical debates are not able to
embrace the feminist criticism of democratic theory,
which stress that there is (1) overemphasis on the
democracy in the workplace, (2) ignorance of differ-
ences between men's and women's lives and embracing
abstract individualism, and (3) overemphasis on public
participation overlooking at the private sphere, namely
women. Academic debates about women's political
participation in Turkey refer to these issues as well.
When women in public life are examined without making
reference to the private sphere, this not only lacks the
complexity of the phenomenon, but also lacks the cultural
and social dimensions. Indeed, in the ‘democratization’
literature, there is an increasing emphasis on the
significance of the private sphere for a well functioning
democratic society. As it has been mentioned earlier, in
the ‘True Clash of Civilizations’, Norris and Inglehart
(2003) point out that Huntington was only half right; that
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Islamic world is not about democratic values regarding
public life, but the expectations from private life, i.e.
sexuality and gender equity. ‘Huntington is mistaken in
assuming that the core clash between the West and Islam
is over political values. The real fault line between the
West and Islam, which Huntington's theory completely
overlooks, concerns gender equity and sexual liberaliza-
tion. In other words, the values separating these cultures
have much more to do with Eros, than demos.’ (Norris &
Inglehart, 2003, p. 65).
Data collection and methodology
Norris and Inglehart's results have inspired this
research, where we assert that in order to understand the
desire of the Turkish people for further democratization,
one must ask what the nature of democracy that they
have in mind is. In other words, to what extent this
desire for further democratization stands for a change in
non-western cultures with respect to gender equity and
respect for homosexual rights? Are Turkish people
ready to tolerate not only those underrepresented ‘sexual
others’ but also the ‘political others’ — those different
from the mainstream political identity, namely Turkish
versus other ethnicities, secular Kemalists vs. Islamists,
Sunni Muslims vs. the Alawite?
The data comes from in-depth interviews and three
workshops conducted towards the consensus building
process on the bottlenecks of Turkish democracy. These
workshops were the most distinctive features of our
research project, where we not only collected our data
through interviews but also shared that data in the
interim report at the workshops with the participants,
where they had an opportunity to revisit their position
on democracy and democratic values.
Action research methodology has a long and diverse
history including different types and typologies of action
research endorsing different epistemologies and ontolo-
gy. As has been discussed very extensively in Cassell and
Johnson's work (2006), this methodology mostly
emerged from organization studies, yet has been recently
employed particularly by feminist studies due to its
endorsement to the ‘many ways of knowing’ and
empowering and informing the participants in the process
of research (Reason, 2006, p.193). Our research also
prioritized the empowerment and information sharing
aspects of action research in the process by conducting
group discussions in three different cities and sharing the
preliminary findings with the participants.
The sampling strategy was to interview those who are
in favor of the EU accession and who are considered asrepresentative agents of certain categories, such as
Islamists, leftists, liberals, conservatives, Kurds, the
Alawite, feminists, gays and lesbians, representatives of
employers and employees. These interviews were con-
ducted in Diyarbakır as well as in Ankara and Istanbul.
The groups we have included in this research can be
categorized as follows: Members of the Parliament from
different political parties; representatives of employer
associations (TOBB — The union of Chambers
and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey; TUSIAD —
Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's Association;
MUSIAD — Muslim Business Men's Association);
representatives of labor unions (DISK — Confederation
of Revolutionary Workers' Unions, TURKIS — Con-
federation of Workers' Unions of Turkey, HAKIS —
Confederation of Rule of the Righteous Workers'
Unions); representatives of civil society associations
(Alawite groups, Kurdish groups, Islamist groups,
women's associations, gays and lesbians' associations,
human rights associations). The sampling strategy
emerged from extensive media coverage analyses where
we first evaluated the statements of the aforementioned
groups in print media. In doing so, wewere surprised with
the similarities in the attitudes of these groups for
democracy and further democratization, and were
encouraged to continue our research.
First, in-depth and open-ended interviews with a total
of forty-three people were conducted in Ankara,
Istanbul, and Diyarbakır between August and November
2005. In order to be able to reach comprehensive data,
we were careful to include diverse and different persons
in the sample from groups who are pro-EU accession
process. In order to address the diversity issues, two
Turkish intellectuals who are not in favor of Turkey's EU
membership process, but openly emphasize democracy
and democratic values in their writings are included.
Since our goal was to identify and elaborate our
respondents' values on democracy, we chose to employ
the in-depth interview technique. In these interviews, the
questions previously prepared were asked to each
respondent. With our open ended questions, we aimed
at revealing (1) how the respondent evaluated the EU
accession process personally and for the group he/she
represented, (2) in which areas, the respondent thought,
the EU process would bring about democratic changes,
(3) to what extent the respondent wished to see the other
or opposite groups benefit from these changes, and finally
(4) with these possible democratic changes, what the
respondent thought about the increasing representation of
ethnic and religious minorities, women's participation in
politics, women's rights, representation of different sexual
identities, human rights, and intra-party democracy.When
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the respondents in order to understand their particular
situations. During each interview, notes were taken and all
the interviews were recorded. Research assistants were
responsible from transcription and thematic coding of the
forty-three interviews. The emerging themes were coded
by ‘tree system coding’ using Microsoft word program.
The emergent themes were analyzed and the interim
report was prepared through these codings.
Sharing the interim report with some of our
respondents in three workshops that we held in Ankara
(04 March 2006), Diyarbakır (18 March 2006), and
Istanbul (25 March 2006) constituted the second stage
of the research. In doing so, we aimed at not only
improving our data, but also to making some contribu-
tion to the consensus building process by providing a
secure space for discussing the possible bottlenecks of
the process of further democratization. In these work-
shops, we shared our findings–the bottlenecks and
common denominators–with our respondents, gave
them some headlines from our interviews, and made
them re-think and re-consider their positions. At the end
of each workshop, we were satisfied to witness how
people from very different backgrounds, with different
ideologies and political positions could reach agreement
on some topics. They agreed on some matters, and
agreed to disagree on some others, which is necessary
for a peaceful democratic process. These workshops are
one of the most distinctive features of our research
project. After having feedbacks on our interim report,
and strengthening the scope of our observations, we
wrote the final version of our research report.
Results
From the start of this research project, we assumed
that there were no agreed definitions of democracy and
democratic values internalized by the political elite, who
favored EU accession, in Turkey. Therefore, the
democratic values would vary from one group to
another. This hypothesis was supported in the research,
suggesting that each political group hopes that its
priorities will be satisfied with the freedoms that are to
be established during the EU accession. Secondly, it was
hypothesized that the discourse on democracy and
democratic values would be variable with time, space,
and conjuncture. This was also supported by our
research: while all the respondents agreed on the
importance of individual rights, when it came to gay
rights, women's rights or the headscarf issue, most of
them suggested that it was somewhat early to extend
individual rights to such claims and groups.With this project we were able to identify the
differences and common denominators in our respon-
dents' views on democratic values. The most important
finding of our research is that while all of the common
denominators among the respondents were about
arrangements of the public sphere, the differences
came to surface when we asked about private sphere,
gender roles, and particularly about sexuality, and rights
and liberties regarding gays and lesbians. Our respon-
dents agreed on the necessity for a fairer representation
of ethnic and religious identities in the public sphere in
one way or another. Although welcoming the demo-
cratic opportunities that spring from the EU accession
process, they were well aware of the fact that such
opportunities did not stem from internal dynamics, but
rather from the demands coming from the EU. Lack of
internalization by the society as a whole and especially
by the bureaucratic elite of the legal liberalization was
identified by almost all the respondents.
For further democratization, the respondents empha-
sized the significance of (1) individual rights and
freedom in communicating their ideas and in getting
organized by legal means, (2) the elimination of poverty
as an obstacle for economic development and political
participation, (3) the reorganization of civil–military
and state–religion relations, and (4) the re-organization
of laws and regulations about the political parties and
the election system.
All the respondents, in spite of their different
backgrounds and the different ideologies they endorsed,
had a consensus of opinion on these issues with the
desire for further democratization and joining the EU.
However, this consensus on the political matters related
with the public sphere seemed to break down when it
came to the issues about the private sphere, gender and
sexuality.
Gender equity
In-depth interviews gave an opportunity to the
respondents to express their stance in their own ways,
and most of the time their responses to the gender equity
and sexuality questions were full of hesitation. Their
initial reaction was more positive, which later came along
with an opposing argument attached with ‘but’s. This
change of opinion in the interviews may be attributed to
the social desirability effect of the respondents. The in-
depth interviews gave us an opportunity to overcome this
first positive stand and allowed us to probe more.
The respondents did not oppose women's political
participation. Furthermore, all admitted that women were
underrepresented in politics. ‘Women are underrepresented
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be represented in the politics. Turbey needs this. The
quota should not be under 40%’ (Istanbul, Female,
Feminist). However, when they were asked about the
social barriers and the positive discrimination possibil-
ities, the majority of the respondents were not in favor
of taking measures, such as quotas, to deal with social
barriers. They revealed their reservations clearly by
using such statements as
‘Well, I think it (quota) is necessary for a while…
indeed it is a nice thought, but if it would not happen
in any other way, we would have to…’ (Istanbul,
Male, Liberal)
‘I am sorry to admit that I don't think we will get
serious results out of the quota for women…maybe
women politicians will act in a sensitive manner
towards women? I don't know… the real thing is the
level of consciousness about the human rights,
politics and democratic values.’ (Ankara, Male,
Human Right Activist)
‘I am in favour of quota but I don't want that women
cease to develop themselves because of the quota. I
think women should first analyse and then think in
depth what is the meaning of being women, what are
the problems of women etc.’ (Diyarbakar, Female,
Activist)
Bringing up such concerns, they argued that it is
more convenient to wait for a natural demand from
women rather than imposing such measures as quota.
‘Very wrong!! I don't take social engineering
projects very positively… If a woman or a man is
politically engaged, he or she will get into politics.
This is a sociological process. You are saying that
you want a catalyst to this process, I don't take it as
being very healthy, it is like producing hormone
induced fruits.’ (Diyarbakır, Male, Conservative)
‘Absolutely wrong! It has to be left out to its natural
course. Women should compete with men. There
shouldn't be any barrier in front of her, but positive
discrimination is wrong. It causes injustice and it is a
waste of energy. I think women shouldn't demand
such a thing, they should work and compete with
men as their equals.’ (Istanbul, Male, Conservative)
‘For me, quota has always been something that is not
natural. It is something artificial. If something doesnot occur naturally, we persist on it to occur’
(Istanbul, Female, Conservative)Domestic violence
It took sometime for the Turkish public to acknowl-
edge domestic violence as a social issue. It is only
recently, with the adaptation process to EU, that the
political elite had to acknowledge this problem and
implement some measures to enforce local governments
to initiate shelters for battered women.
‘This (domestic violence) is a social problem, open
sore… this is definitely related with the development
level of a society and also education… in the end, we
are an oriental society… it won't go away easily.’
(Ankara, Male, Conservative)
The respondents' attitudes towards the involvement of
public institutions in interference with domestic violence
were not positive. When asked if they agree to the role
played bywomen's shelters whenwomen are subjected to
violence, they again came upwith conditional acceptance.
‘They are very useful but I think that we shouldn't go
beyond the purpose… I mean, there will be fights
between husband andwife; it is very popular in Turkey
that when women get mad, they go to their mothers'
house. When there is no mother to go to, they may go
to places like these shelters… But this should not go as
far as excluding men and the sacredness of the family,
that will end in a dangerous point that is against
tradition.’ (Istanbul, Male, Islamist)
Usually the responses started with a sentence such as
‘when there is violence, the state should get involved,
but…’. Such responses usually continued with state-
ments that put the sacredness and the unity of the family
to the human rights of women. They perceived women
as a member of the family rather than as an individual,
and stressed to preserve, secure, and control the women
within the family. It was not surprising that an
unconditional support for women's shelters only came
from gays and feminists.
Gay and lesbian rights
The argument of ‘it is the nature of women’ argument
came to surface once again when we asked our
respondents about the public rights of those people
who have different sexual orientations other than the
heterosexual ones. They all accepted that the differences
should be represented, but the ‘unnatural’ nature of
Endnotes
1 A sect of Islam that reveres Ali, the fourth Caliph and
Mohammed's son-in-law.
2 See Weber/Schroeder (1998) for a detailed review of Weber's
account on culture, development and democracy.
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among the respondents.
‘When I consider the issue as a doctor, I take them
(gays and lesbians) normal. But we have to be
careful not to encourage such things.’ (Diyarbakır,
Male, Social Democrat)
While those who came from conservative or religious
backgrounds defined homosexuality as a ‘deviation’,
‘abnormality’, or ‘a modern degeneration’, those with
more liberal political stance used medical terminology
and evaluated homosexuality as some kind of illness to
be cured. Most respondents also emphasized how
different sexual orientations can be detrimental to the
most important social institution: the family. Not only a
woman's role but also that of a man in the family was
central when opposing homosexuality. Man as the
husband and father of the family could not be gay, which
would be the destruction of the family — the very
foundation of the society and could not be accepted by
most of our respondents.
‘I am not against gays and lesbians… to tell you the
truth, it does not bother me. But when it comes to
them having children, of course you need to consider
the child.. You will be limiting the child's life and
social perception and this will have a negative
impact on the psychology of the child.’ (Istanbul,
Female, Liberal)
‘I think that people should not be punished because
of their sexual preferences or identities or their
private life. (…) However, I find the right of getting
married and having children problematic.’ (Istanbul,
Female, Socialist Muslim)
‘I think it (civil rights) should be given to them. But
it is important to have these rights with consensus as
much as possible.’ (Istanbul, Male, Liberal)Conclusion
This article agreeswithNorris and Inglehart's (2002, p.
261) conclusion that ‘[t] hemost basic cultural fault line…
involves issues of gender equality and sexual liberaliza-
tion,’ and ‘… these issues have important implications for
democracy’. However, when it comes to the analysis of
gender equity it is hazardous to make overgeneralizations
where one falls into culturalist–essentialist fault line
easily. Moghadam (1994, p. 7) warns us that ‘culture
masks more than it reveals’. Therefore, when we are
looking at gender equity and sexual liberty issues in thenon-western world, we need to use more dynamic
concepts than the essentialist religious perception as has
been argued in Norris and Inglehart. Moghadam argues
that gender and sexuality are the key pillars of the non-
western cultures, which almost all the time organize in
response to the hegemony of the West. Women as the
representative of the nation — culture, produce and
reproduce the culture therefore; their bodies are controlled
with all the possible means within the family.
‘One answer to identity politics which seeks to
control women is to disarticulate women from
culture, deconstruct women as symbol, reconstruct
women as human beings, and problematize women's
rights as human rights.’ (Moghadam, 1994, 22)
Most of the respondents of this research regardless of
their political stance — conservative, liberal, social
democrat or Islamist, all had conservative values
regarding the enhancement of women's political
participation, their sexual liberties, positive discrimina-
tion and public involvement with the private sphere, and
gay and lesbian rights. This may be attributed to the
defensive nature of the identity politics in the Turkey of
the 2000s, and that all these political stances have to
cope with the contemporary macro political atmosphere
in order to preserve their existence. Therefore, although
it is possible to understand this convergence of the
majority of the political elite towards conservative
gender politics and sexual politics, it is also worth to
note that only the feminists and the gay and lesbian
groups, both of which are marginal in Turkey today, had
the challenge to stay out of this discourse.References
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